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Executive Summary 
 This paper seeks to determine the effects of state budget changes on local government 
expenditures; particularly, how changes in state funding provided to local governments affects 
local government expenditures. The hypothesis tested is that state funding is a significant factor 
on local government expenditure. To evaluate this, two levels of analysis were conducted. The 
first was a paneled fixed effects regression analysis of data for all fifty states from the years 2000 
to 2013, in which changes to local expenditure were measured by the effects of multiple fiscal 
and socioeconomic variables. The second level of analysis evaluated the same effects during the 
same time period using the same method, but for county level expenditures for the state of New 
York.  
 The results from the analysis showed that, at both the national level for all states and the 
New York state level for all counties, state aid or transfers to local governments was a 
statistically significant factor on local expenditures. The data for all fifty states showed that for 
every $100 increase in per capita state intergovernmental revenue, per capita local expenditures 
increased by $116, or that a 6.8% change in state IG revenue results in a 2.3% change in local 
expenditure. For the county level data for New York, the analysis showed that for every $100 
increase in per capita state aid, per capita local expenditures increased by approximately $45, or 
that a 40% change in state aid results in a 2.5% change in local expenditures.  
 These results would support our hypothesis that state funding, either through direct aid or 
other intergovernmental revenue transfer mechanisms, is a significant factor on local government 
spending on projects and services; as such, it can be assumed that when state governments 
reduce their budgets, local governments see their ability to fund projects and services reduced 
without resorting to another funding mechanism. 
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Problem Statement 
 In the United States, 49 out of 50 states have some form of a balanced budget 
requirement as reported by the National Conference of State Legislatures. The rules behind these 
requirements vary from state to state, but the intention is the same – by being required to keep 
balanced budgets, states are theoretically able to ensure that government operations are occurring 
efficiently and affordably. However, an issue that is frequently discussed is the effect that the 
outcomes of balanced budgeting has on local governments – often, states balance their budgets 
by cutting spending to various programs, which in turn causes local governments who were no 
longer getting funding from the states to adapt. Sometimes, this comes in the form of litigation or 
legislative action, such as in Ohio, where a governor’s veto of $80 million to education spending 
was later reversed. More often, however, local governments are forced to make funding 
adjustments to react to the shortfall from state cuts.  
 What I would like to determine is the net effect of balanced budget requirements on local 
governments and citizens. Specifically, I would like to know if cutting spending to create a 
balanced state budget requires local governments to make potentially negative changes to 
account for the reduction in state spending. 
 The way that I will conduct this research this is to measure the effect of changes to state 
budgeting on local governments. When states reduce expenditures, particularly in terms of 
transfers to local governments, how does it impact changes in local government? Does it affect 
local government expenditure, which could in turn affect the amount of services provided to 
citizens? I will be using fiscal and socioeconomic data from all states for several years to try to 
measure these effects.  
There is a significant policy issue at stake. If cutting spending at the state level to balance 
the budget is having an overall negative effect within the state enacting the budget cuts, perhaps 
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a different method of balancing budgets (or even budgeting overall) should be considered to 
make sure that the state budget is being created and maintained in a way that benefits citizens 
rather than harms them. While it may be politically expedient to be able to say “we balanced the 
budget,” from a practical standpoint it should be examined to make sure that these types of 
requirements are having the positive effects that we would hope to achieve through the budgeting 
process. 
Literature Review 
Many of the research articles on this topic were written from the early to mid-1960s; 
more recent articles addressing this issue do not examine the same topic researched here. With 
that in mind, this review includes directly relevant articles (journal articles and otherwise). 
 Charles Tiebout’s 1956 article “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures” examined the 
model of public goods and how citizens voice their preferences for public goods. Unlike 
previous research, which had assumed that the federal government primarily handled public 
goods spending, Tiebout made the case that local expenditures on public goods were more 
important for measuring people’s preferences, because citizens are more likely and able to 
choose communities whose public goods provision better reflect their preferences. (Tiebout, 
1956). This article establishes the importance of goods and services provided by local 
government; when noting the effect of state government fiscal changes on local governments, 
acknowledging that importance of local government expenditure is necessary.  
 Seymour Sacks and Robert Harris (1964) looked to build on research by Fisher (1957), in 
which Fisher found that because the variation of state and local expenditures explained by 
population, urbanization, and income had been reduced since 1942, there must be some 
unexplained variation. The authors attempted to account for that “unexplained variation” by 
measuring federal aid to state governments and state aid to local governments using data from 
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1960, finding that “state aid often reduces pressures on local governments to hold their 
expenditures down” (Sacks and Harris 1964).  
 In the same issue of the National Tax Journal as the Sacks and Harris article, Glenn 
Fisher wrote an updated version of his research, which expanded on his initial research also 
using data from 1960 to try to explain more of the variance by expanding the number of 
variables - this article was also intended as a rebuttal to the Sacks and Harris article, arguing that 
“the statistical procedures used overstate the importance of federal aid as a cause of variation in 
expenditure” (Fisher 1964). Fisher found a high negative correlation between levels of 
expenditure and percent of low income families in the state, putting forth the hypothesis that 
low-income families are more politically resistant to higher expenditure if that expenditure 
results in higher taxes. He also concluded that the use of federal aid as an independent variable is 
likely invalid, but that state aid to local government “should be included in future studies of this 
type” (Fisher 1964). 
 Moving ahead to 1988, John Wallis and Wallace Oates (1988) chapter, “Decentralization 
in the Public Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government,” from an out of print 
book called Fiscal Federalism: Quantitative Studies, used a collection of Census data to model 
the trend of fiscal responsibility moving from local governments to the states at the first half of 
the 20th century. This data was used to measure the halt of that trend and predicting the potential 
of fiscal decentralization away from the states at the end of the 20th century (Wallis and Oates 
1988). This research on the fluctuation in the relationship between state and local government 
expenditures could be useful in noting recent trends in state and local spending and how local 
governments react to fiscal changes in different economic and political climates.  
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Poterba’s (1994) article, “State Responses to Fiscal Crises,” examined how state fiscal 
decisions are affected by fiscal rules and political factors. However, Poterba didn’t look at the 
relationship between state and local governments when fiscal changes occur. The primary 
finding of this paper was that state fiscal rules such as balanced budget amendments and 
spending limits have significant effects on the ability of states to respond unexpected fiscal 
shocks. It also noted the importance of political factors, such as party control of the state house 
and the governorship and whether it is a gubernatorial election year when the shock occurs 
(Poterba 1994). Although the article does not specifically apply to the relationship between state 
and local governments, it did generate some good ideas for which explanatory variables might be 
considered.  
In 1995, Poterba followed up his 1994 article with “Balanced Budget Rules and Fiscal 
Policy: Evidence from the States” in the National Tax Journal. In response to the discussion of a 
federal balanced budget amendment, Poterba looked at the effects of balanced budget rules at the 
state level to determine their effects on fiscal policy to determine whether there are any 
implications that should be noted when considering a federal balanced budget rule. An important 
distinction that he notes in this article is that when states report that they faced prospective 
deficits, much of the action that they take to close these potential deficits occurs through 
spending cuts, followed (in a distant second) by revenue increases, and finally by “other actions” 
such as changes in the accounting process (Poterba 1995).  
 Reschovsy (2003) attempted to measure the impact of state government budget shortfalls 
on local governments. By analyzing previous behavior of state governments in response to 
budget crises, Reschovsky concludes that “in many states, aid to local governments and school 
districts will be reduced by a greater percentage amount than reductions in overall state 
6 
 
spending” and that “it is likely that many of these cuts in state aid will translate into reductions in 
public services.” (Reschovsky 2003).  
 Greer and Denison (2016) provide the most recent research on this topic. They examine 
the distribution of debt between state and local governments, and measure the factors that affect 
how states and localities determine who will take on the most debt concentration. (Greer and 
Denison 2016). Their research adds a further layer of consideration on the relationship between 
state and local fiscal determinations, as well as provided further potential explanatory variables 
to measure in my own research with the inclusion of the concentration of debt at both the state 
and local level.  
Research Design 
My research attempts to measure the balance of fiscal responsibility and program funding 
implementation between state and local governments. The goal is to see if, when states cut 
spending to balance their budgets, local governments must react in such a way that the positive 
effects of a balanced state budget are offset. This was examined to an extent by Poterba (1995), 
who found that when states are faced with potential deficits, most of the action taken to offset 
this deficit occurs through spending cuts. Additionally, Rechovsky (2003) concluded that states 
faced with budget crises reduced aid to local governments and school districts by a greater 
amount than reductions in overall state spending. 
 I further examine this issue by looking at how local governments respond to changes in 
state level spending. This is done with two levels of data. First, I perform a fixed effects panel 
regression analysis of all fifty states from the years 2000 to 2013 using a combination of fiscal 
data from the Urban Institute’s Tax Policy Center (Urban Institute 2015) and socioeconomic and 
political data from the University of Kentucky Poverty Research Center (UK Center for Poverty 
Research 2016). This data is aggregated total local expenditure, total local revenue, local 
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property tax, local outstanding debt and the change in local debt during a given year; I will also 
include data for total state revenue, total state expenditure, gross state product, unemployment 
rate, state outstanding debt, the change in state debt during a given year and total state 
intergovernmental revenue; and political data such as whether the Governor is a Democrat and 
whether Democrats have greater than fifty percent control over the state House and Senate. All 
of my included fiscal data is per capita. My hypothesis is that state aid significantly affects the 
amount of local expenditures in a given year, and that this will be reflected both in national data 
and at the county level. 
 Once I have outcomes for the state level data, I repeat the regression analysis for a single 
state at the county level to determine if similar results occur. For this, I will evaluate the state of 
New York; I chose New York because of their extensive reporting on county fiscal information 
for multiple years, as reported by the Office of the Comptroller (New York OSC, 2017). I chose 
county level government data because there is uniformity in the structure of county governments 
compared to city governments, which can have different structures even within a single state. 
Measuring state level data will allow me to establish patterns that might support my hypothesis, 
and county level data measurements will be used to verify whether those patterns and the 
hypothesis hold. 
State Level Analysis  
 The first level of analysis conducted was a fixed effects panel regression on data for all 
fifty states from 2000 to 2013 (because there was missing data for some variables for the years 
2001 and 2003, those years were omitted from my state level analysis). For lag purposes, I also 
collected data for 1999, but did not include 1999 in the regression year.  For the regression, my 
dependent variable is the total aggregate amount of local expenditures per capita in real dollars 
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(for the remainder of my analysis, all fiscal variables are per capita in real dollars). My 
independent variables are state population, state unemployment rate, total state expenditure, total 
local revenue, percent change state debt, percent change local debt, total state intergovernmental 
revenue (in this dataset, “total state intergovernmental revenue” is the name given to the revenue 
that local governments get from the states), whether the governor is a Democrat (a binary 
variable which is 1 if the governor is a Democrat), and whether the Democrats hold the majority 
in the state Senate and state House (each is a binary variable created using data regarding the 
percentage of Democrats in each chamber, where the variable is equal to 1 if the percentage is 
greater than fifty percent).  
Before conducting my regression analysis, I first did a summary analysis of my data in 
order to get a better overall view of the information I gathered. The summary analysis returned 
the results seen in Table 1. 
Table 1. State Level Summary Statistics (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Total Local Expenditure 5089.52 2612.98 1992 24163 
Total State Expenditure 6346.95 1872.05 3805 19293 
Total Local Revenue 4696.75 1195.50 1817 9751 
Total State IG Revenue 1464.07 480.45 161 3497 
Local Property Tax 1242.19 532.98 244 3001 
Total State Revenue 6598.64 2359.75 1632 25678 
State Population 5981439 6585855 494300 38414128 
State Unemployment Rate .0592 .0209 .023 .137 
Governor is a Democrat (1 if yes) .4643 .4991 0 1 
Democrats Control House (1 if yes) .5356 .4991 0 1 
Democrats Control Senate (1 if yes) .4929 .5003 0 1 
Percent Change Local Debt .0158 .0623 -.2507 .2642 
Percent Change State Debt .0889 .5545 .-8517 5.343 
 
Assuming that local expenditures will change as a reaction to the previous year’s fiscal 
variables, I lagged all the fiscal independent variables by one year; in addition, I lagged the 
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political variables by one year since budgets are previously made for the next fiscal year in the 
current fiscal year. This resulted in every variable except for population and unemployment rate 
being lagged, and the regression equation is as follows:  
TotalLocalExpenditurei,t = αi + β1TotalLocalRevenuei,t-1 + β2TotalStateRevenuei,t-1 + 
β3TotalStateExpenditurei,t-1 + β4LocalPropertyTaxi,t-1 + β5GovernorisaDemocrati,t-1 + 
β6UnemploymentRatei,t + β7Populationi,t + β8DemocratControlHousei,t-1 + 
β9DemocratControlSenatei,t-1 + β10ChangeLocalDebti,t-1 + 
β11ChangeStateDebtOutstandingi,t-1  + β12TotalStateIGRevenuei,t-1 + εi,t 
 
 My expectation was that the variables for state expenditure, local revenue, state 
intergovernmental revenue, and local property tax will be significant, as well as the variable for a 
Democratic Governor and Democratic control of the House; the first four variables I expected 
significance from due to either the direct effect on local funds available for expenditure or the 
effect on the amount of state funds available to potentially use to increase transfers to local 
governments, while the two political variables reflect the fact that the House is primarily the 
budget making body in a state and the Governor sets the economic policy agenda, and in both 
instances Democrats are more likely to approve greater state level spending overall which could 
possibly include transfers to local governments. These expectations were somewhat accurate, as 
reflected in the analysis in Table 2. 
Prior to running my regression, I ran a variance inflation factor command to catch any 
potential multicollinearity issues. The VIF returned nothing of significant magnitude. With this 
being the case, I proceeded with my fixed effects regression, which produced the results seen in 
Table 2. 
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Table 2. State Level Regression Analysis (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars) 
 R-sq: Within     = 0.4153   Number of obs  = 400 
           Between   = 0.0278   Number of Groups = 50 
           Overall    = 0.0307 
 
Total Local Expenditures Coef. Robust 
Std.Err. 
T p>|t| 95% confidence 
interval 
Total State Expenditure (lag) -.1053 .0493 -2.14 0.038 -.2044 -- -.0062 
Total Local Revenue (lag) .1105 .0945 1.17 0.024 -.0794 -- .3004 
Total State IG Revenue (lag) 1.159 .1598 7.26 0 .8386 -- 1.481 
Local Property Tax(lag) .4862 .1996 2.44 0.019 .0851 -- .8872 
Total State Revenue (lag) .0012 .0197 0.06 0.950 -.0384 -- .0408 
State Population -.0002 .0001 -3.19 0.002 -.0003 -- -.0001 
State Unemployment Rate 5965.42 1906.69 3.13 0.003 2133.77 -- 9797.07 
Governor is a Democrat (1 if 
yes, lag) 
-6.935 26.255 -0.26 0.793 -59.696 -- 45.826 
Democrats Control House (1 if 
yes, lag) 
141.77 72.1994 1.96 0.055 -3.319 -- 286.861 
Democrats Control Senate (1 if 
yes, lag) 
-84.966 62.992 -1.35 0.184 -211.554 -- 41.622 
Local debt change (lag) 436.569 192.3958 2.27 0.028 49.935 -- 823.203 
State debt change (lag) 427.586 298.3009 1.43 0.158 -171.872 -- 1027.044 
 
The statistically significant explanatory variables for aggregate total local expenditure are 
total state expenditure, total state IG revenue, aggregated local property tax, state population, 
state unemployment rate, Democratic control of the House, and aggregated local debt change.  
Total state expenditure and total local expenditures are negatively correlated. This could be 
because as states increase their total expenditures, local governments do not need to spend as 
much on provision of services or capital projects that the state would pick up, therefore total 
local expenditure decreases. 
Total state IG revenue is positively correlated. This is the outcome my hypothesis predicted – 
as states increase the amount of revenue they provide to local governments, the amount of 
funding that local governments have to spend is increased, which leads to an increase in local 
expenditures.  
11 
 
Aggregated local property tax is positively correlated. Property taxes are a significant 
revenue function for local governments; it is reasonable to expect that increasing local property 
tax increases the amount of local funds to spend, and similarly raises local expenditures. 
State population and local expenditures are negatively correlated; as the state population goes 
up, the amount of revenue collected by the state overall may increase, which in turn would allow 
states to increase expenditures – as noted, state expenditure and local expenditure are also 
negatively correlated. 
In discussing the state unemployment rate, it is important to note the variables in the dataset 
are presented as percentages, so a 5% unemployment rate is reflected in the data as 0.05 rather 
than 5; to analyze the size of the coefficient on the dependent variable, the decimal of the 
coefficient must be shifted to the left two digits, meaning that a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate increases local expenditure by approximately $60 rather than $6,000. It can 
be assumed that, as the unemployment rate in a state goes up, more people are seeking services 
both at the state and local level, and therefore local expenditures would increase as a result. 
Democratic control of the House is positively correlated. The state House is typically the 
primary body responsible for crafting the state budget (and Democrats are more likely generally 
to approve spending increases, including increases to local government funding), as such, it is 
reasonable to expect that Democratic control of the state House would increase local funds 
provided by the state, thereby increasing local expenditures as a result. 
Aggregated local debt change, like unemployment rate, is a percentage, so local expenditure 
would increase by approximately four dollars for every percent increase in local debt – 
presumably because local debt can be accrued to have funds to spend on capital projects or 
expansion of services. 
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Since the variable of interest in the hypothesis was total state intergovernmental revenue, the 
coefficient for Total State IG Revenue is the effect we would like to measure. The analysis 
shows that for every dollar increase in per capita state intergovernmental revenue, per capita 
local expenditure goes up by approximately $1.16. Another way to view this relationship is to 
measure the percent change of state intergovernmental revenue relative to local expenditure. To 
do this, we will first consider the means of our statistics from our summary analysis. The average 
amount of per capita total local expenditure is approximately $5,090; the average amount of per 
capita state intergovernmental revenue is approximately $1,464. We will simplify our percentage 
change equation by multiplying the coefficient amount by $100, so for every $100 increase in 
per capita state intergovernmental revenue, per capita local expenditure goes up by $116. This 
would mean that if average state intergovernmental revenue increases from $1,464 to $1,564 (a 
6.8% change), average local expenditure would increase from $5,090 to $5,206 (a 2.3% change). 
Therefore, a 6.8% change in state intergovernmental revenue would result in a 2.3% change in 
local expenditures. 
County Level Analysis 
 
 For my second level of analysis, I wanted to test my findings for the state level data on 
county level data from a single state, which would allow me to capture the variance between 
local governments within a state. The database used for this analysis was compiled of yearly 
reports from the New York Office of the Comptroller, with state level variables merged into the 
table from my initial dataset. Like my first dataset, my analysis will be for the years 2000 
through 2013 (again, data was collected for the year 1999 for lag purposes but not included in the 
analysis). 
13 
 
The variables I initially included for this analysis are local total expenditures, total state 
expenditures, local revenue, state revenue, total state aid, county population, state population, 
amount of local property tax collected, gross state product, state unemployment rate, local 
unemployment rate, state debt change percentage, local debt change percentage, and whether or 
not the Governor is a Democrat in a given year. Running summary statistics for this dataset 
produced the results in Table 3. 
Table 3. County Level Summary Statistics (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars) 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Local Total Expenditures 1783.89 494.83 722.05 4731.52 
Total State Expenditure 8540.96 860.46 6901 9762 
Local Revenue 1238.76 412.72 581.40 3927.55 
Total State Revenue 8652.07 1511.88 5181 10904 
Total State Aid 247.95 60.36 101.49 683.63 
County Population 193601.1 298831 4836 1493350 
State Population 19263081.21 204505.3 19001780 19691032 
Local Property Tax 346.27 144.63 111.21 1321.87 
Gross State Product 53853.37 7371.48 42994.87 65320.46 
State Unemployment Rate .0632 .0517 .045 .086 
Local Unemployment Rate .0629 .0196 .024 .128 
Percent State Debt Change  .0154 .0273 -.0337 .0721 
Percent Local Debt Change .7480 11.27 -1 285.21 
Governor is a Democrat .5 .5003 0 1 
 
Similarly to the first model, I conducted a VIF test to check for multicollinearity prior to 
conducting my regression. Running the VIF found that Gross State Product was causing 
multicollinearity issues; removing the variable eliminated the issue, so it is omitted from the 
regression analysis. This leaves the final regression equation as follows:  
LocalTotalExpenditurei,t = αi + β1LocalRevenuei,t-1 + β2TotalStateAidi,t-1 + 
β3CountyPopulationi,t + β4StatePopulationi,t + β5GovernorisaDemocrati,t-1 + 
β6PercentLocalDebtChangei,t-1 + β7PercentStateDebtChangei,t-1 + 
β8StateUnemploymentRatei,t + β9LocalUnemploymentRatei,t + β10TotalStateRevenuei,t-1 + 
β11TotalStateExpenditurei,t-1  + β12LocalRealPropertyTaxi,t-1 + εi,t 
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In this model, I expected to see significance in the local revenue variable, the total state 
aid variable, the variable for total state expenditure, and the variable for local property tax – this 
is due to the fact that these are the variables that I would expect to directly affect the amount of 
funds that local governments have available for expenditure. One difference of note about this 
regression is that I have omitted the variables for Democratic control of the House and the Senate 
that were included in the regression for all states; this is because there was no variation in House 
or Senate control for New York in the given time period so the variable would be unchanging, 
and therefore does not need to be included in the analysis. With the necessary variables included, 
my regression produced the results in Table 4. 
Table 4: County Level Regression Analysis (Fiscal Variables in Per Capita Dollars) 
 R-sq: Within     = 0.8306   Number of obs  = 728 
           Between   = 0.3142   Number of Groups = 57 
           Overall    = 0.4476 
 
The statistically significant variables that the model produced are local revenue, total state 
aid, Governor is a Democrat, percent of local debt change, and total state expenditure.  
Local Total Expenditures Coef. Robust 
Std.Err. 
T p>|t| 95% confidence interval 
Local Revenue (lag) .7811 .1364 5.73 0 .5078 -- 1.0544 
Total State Aid (lag) .4530 .1926 2.35 0.022 .0673 -- .8388  
County Population -.0010 .0007 -1.36 0.018 -.0025 -- .0005 
State Population -.0001 .0001 -0.80 0.425 -.0002 -- .0001 
Governor is a Democrat (1 if 
yes, lag) 
127.30 29.298 4.35 0 68.609 -- 185.991 
Percent Local Debt Change 
(lag) 
.9126 .2502 3.65 0.001 .4113 -- 1.414 
Percent State Debt Change 
(lag) 
341.93 479.30 0.71 0.479 -618.233 -- 1302.112 
State Unemployment Rate 481.033 1243.752 0.39 0.7 -2010.502 -- 2972.568 
Local Unemployment Rate -1980.903 1033.681 -1.92 0.06 -4051.616 -- 89.809 
Total State Revenue (lag) .0013 .0053 0.24 0.812 -.0094 -- .0119 
Total State Expenditure (lag) .0623 .0309 2.01 0.049 .0002 -- .1243 
Local Real Property Tax 
(lag) 
-.1004 .2137 -0.47 0.64 -.5285 -- .3277 
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Local Revenue is positively correlated. As local governments earn more revenue, they have 
more funds to spend; therefore, local expenditures might increase as a result. 
Total state aid is also positively correlated. This is the result my hypothesis predicted – as 
states provide more aid to local governments, they can increase their spending. 
 Initially, I thought the positive correlation of the Governor being a Democrat was a political 
impact; Democratic governors are typically more likely to approve budgets that would include 
more state level spending, including spending in aid to local governments. While this may be 
true, what might be captured in this analysis is time related. Prior to 2006, New York had a 
Republican governor; after 2006, New York had a Democratic Governor. This variable might be 
noticing the fluctuations in expenditures prior to 2006 (after 9/11 but before the recession) and 
after 2006 (the recession and its aftermath). 
Percent of local debt change is positively correlated. If a local government takes on more 
debt, they are possibly doing so to spend on projects or services. 
Unlike in the state level model, total state expenditure here is positively correlated. Since 
total state expenditures include state aid to local governments, it could be possible that as state 
expenditure increases, state aid to local governments might be a part of that increase, and as such 
the amount of funds that local governments have available to spend would also increase. The 
difference in the direction of the correlation here could be a reflection that more states overall see 
a negative correlation between these two variables, but that New York is one of the states in the 
minority in this aspect; it could also be that county level governments are more likely to have a 
positive correlation between these variables than other levels of local government. 
To account for the effects of state aid on local government expenditures, we would consider 
the coefficient of the variable Total State Aid on local expenditure, which is 0.453. This shows 
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that, per capita, for every dollar increase in total state aid to local governments, local government 
expenditure increases by approximately forty-five cents.  
Like the first analysis, I will measure the percent change of total state aid relative to the 
percent change to local expenditure. From our summary statistics, the average per capita local 
total expenditure amount is approximately $1,784. The average per capita amount of state aid is 
approximately $248. Because every dollar of state aid increases local expenditure by forty-five 
cents, we will assume for every $100 increase in state aid, local expenditure increases by $45. 
Next, we will measure the percentage change. Using average state aid, a $100 increase will raise 
average state aid from $248 to $348. Therefore, the percentage change from the original amount 
to the amount with $100 in aid is approximately 40%. Next, we will assume that the $100 
increase in state aid created a $45 increase in local total expenditure; this takes the average local 
total expenditure from $1,784 to $1,829, a percentage change of approximately 2.5%. Therefore, 
we can assume that, when the state adjusts aid to local governments by 40 percent, the average 
change to local government expenditure is 2.5 percent. 
State/County Comparison 
 The patterns of the effects established in the analysis can also be found in the analysis at 
the county level. Many of the same variables that are significant in the initial analysis are 
significant in the second analysis; importantly, the variables of interest in both analyses – state 
intergovernmental revenues and state aid to county governments – are statistically significant. 
 The primary difference to note between these two analysis models is the magnitude of the 
effect of a change in aid to local governments. There are several reasons why this might be 
occurring. It could be based in the data used in the models; where the state level model 
aggregates all levels of local spending, it could be capturing levels of local government where 
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the effect of changes in state aid is more amplified. It could also be structural; county 
governments may generally be able to adapt to changes in state aid and transfers, and could be 
able to substitute lost funding from that aid from other sources. Additionally, it could be that 
there is some unaccounted for unique characteristic to New York that is not present overall 
nationally which is amplified by performing analysis specifically on that state. There are two 
potential options to determine if one of these reasons is reflected in the research. Future research 
could either conduct the county level analysis for a broader number of states, or determine the 
effects on specific levels of government by splitting the aggregate local spending data into 
county, city, municipality, special district, and other levels and running the analysis individually.  
Limitations and Future Research Recommendations 
There are some limitations that should be accounted for. Although I do think that I had an 
adequate amount of data to conduct the evaluation, having the missing data for 2001 and 2003 to 
include in the regressions would make the analysis more complete. It might also be worth 
consideration to analyze a longer period of time to capture any variations that might have occur 
due to long term political factors. There may also be additional variables that affect state aid and 
transfers to local governments beyond what I have included, such as whether a given year in 
each state is an election year. Likewise, collecting data on local political factors might provide an 
additional level of analysis, as variables for local political data could affect local expenditure 
decisions.  
When considering future research on this topic, expanding the list of variables and the 
time period of data collection might be considered in order to further develop the model. 
Additionally, reframing the model around more specific dependent variables where available 
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could narrow the focus in a way that determines the effects of state aid and transfers on specific 
types of spending, such as education, public health, public safety, or administrative expenditures. 
Conclusion 
 After conducting an analysis for two datasets – one that measures effects on local 
expenditures for all fifty states with aggregate local data, and one that measures effects on local 
expenditure for New York’s county level data to capture local variation, my hypothesis that state 
mechanisms to provide funding to local governments is a statistically significant factor on local 
government expenditures on services and other projects was supported. This is reflected both in 
the aggregate local data for all fifty states where a 6.8% change in state IG revenue results in a 
2.3% change in local expenditure, and also for the county government level for the state of New 
York, where a 40% change in state aid results in a 2.5% change in local expenditures. While 
these percentages might seem relatively small, a 2.5% reduction in expenditures could have a 
significant impact when those expenditures go to public services, such as education or public 
health or safety. When the option for local governments is to either reduce the provision of those 
services or to find other funding mechanisms such as increasing local taxes, it may be worth 
consideration to those responsible for state budgeting to consider the effects of state level 
funding cuts, particularly if those cuts include funding for local governments.  
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